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(3) Dick purports to be based upon State law and therefore can-
not be regarded as abandoning the Thayer theory when a federal
court has a freedom of choice.
SHOULD UTAH COURTS REVIEW JUDGMENTS
OF ILLINOIS COURTS
ON QUESTIONS OF ILLINOIS LAW?
WILFRED J. R-rz*
It would seem axiomatic that the original judicial determina-
tion of the law of a particular state is within the exclusive province of
the courts of that state. In conflict of laws cases, of course, the courts
of one state must ascertain what is the law of other states, and some-
times fall into error in doing so,' but this is a different process than
declaring the law as an original proposition. Moreover, the courts
of every state are obligated, when the question is properly presented, to
determine whether another state's law or its application violates the
Federal Constitution.2 On occasion, in reviewing a state court decision
the U. S. Supreme Court has itself declared what state law is, either
because a federal constitutional question was involved3 or because
it felt that the state law involved was entirely clear.
4
Nevertheless, the apparent basic principle that the courts of a
particular state, to the exclusion of those of other states, are the only
proper judicial agency to determine the law of their own state is
sometimes violated, where the question presented is one of the state's
jurisdiction under the state's own law.
Conn v. Whitmore,5 from the Supreme Court of Utah, is illustra-
tive. Conn raised Arabian horses in Illinois. By correspondence "in
February of 1955" he offered the defendant a mare at a price of "less
*Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University.
1Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 58t (1951) (U.S. Supreme Court corrected
Court of Appeals of New York on a question of Florida law); Barber v. Barber,
323 U.S. 77 (1944) (U.S. Supreme Court corrected Supreme Court of Tennessee on
a question of North Carolina law); Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59 (1938) (U.S. Supreme
Court corrected Texas Court of Civil Appeals on question of Califo-nia law).
2Young v. Masci, 289 US. 253 (1933).
'West Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22 (1951).4Hanson v. Denckla, 357 US. 235 (1958).
5342 P.ad 871 (1959).
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than her 1955 foal should be worth."0 Eventually, Whitmore bought
the mare, sent an employee to Illinois to get the horse, and gave Conn
a check for the purchase price. Difficulty arose between.the parties be-
cause "the mare was not in foal," and as a result Whitmore stopped
payment on the check. Thereafter, Conn sued Whitmore in a cir-
cuit court of Illinois for the purchase price, relying on an Illinois
statute that gives the courts of that state jurisdiction over contro-
versies arising out of the transaction of any business in Illinois.7 Whit-
more did not appear and the Illinois circuit court entered judgment
against him. Conn then sued upon this judgment in a district court of
Utah. Whitmore defended by challenging the jurisdiction of the Il-
linois court. The trial court of Utah reviewed the facts and sustained
this defense, because, as the Supreme Court of Utah said in affirming:
"Upon the basis of those facts the trial court found that the de-
fendant did not 'transact any business within the state of Illi-
nois," within the meaning of the statute quoted [Illinois
statute]."s
In so holding the Utah courts, for practical purposes, sat as courts
of appeal reviewing the action of an Illinois trial court on a question
of local Illinois law. It would seem obvious that under the Illinois
Constitution and statutes the Illinois trial court was charged with
full responsibility and authority in cases before it to ascertain and
declare Illinois law, and that the courts of Utah did not have any
authority in the premises. Yet, in Conn v. Whitmore the Utah courts,
both trial and appellate, substituted their judgment for that of an
Illinois court on a question of Illinois law.
The cases cited in the text of the opinion of the Supreme Court
of Utah do not support this ground of decision. These cases will be
briefly noted. Nelson v. Miller9 is the leading Illinois decision from
the Supreme Court of Illinois on the statute involved in the case
and so is controlling in Illinois and elsewhere as to what Illinois law
is. In Conn v. Whitmore the Utah courts, presumptuously it would
seem, took the position that an Illinois trial court was not familiar with
this decision or, if it was, that it did not know how to apply the de-
cision. International Shoe Co. v. State of WashingtonO is relevant
on the question of whether the rule of Illinois law, under which Whit-
more was subjected to Illinois jurisdiction, is valid under the Federal
'Id. at 872.
ll. Civil Practice Act §§ 16-17.
8342 P.2d at 872.
&I1 IL. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957).
1326 US. 31o (1945).
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Constitution. It does not authorize Utah courts to examine the juris-
diction of Illinois courts under Illinois law. Pennoyer v. Neff1 and
McGee v. International Life Ins. Co.12 authorized the Utah courts to
examine the jurisdiction of the Illinois trial court under the Federal
Constitution.
As an alternative ground of decision the Supreme Court of Utah
said that the exercise of jurisdiction by the Illinois court was invalid
under the Federal Constitution. Pennoyer v. Neff and McGee v. In-
ternational Life Ins. Co. support this ground of decision, the cor-
rectness of which is not being questioned.
Instead, the purpose here is to point out that there is a distinction
between jurisdiction under a state's own law and jurisdiction under
the Federal Constitution. When a state court in the position of the
Illinois court in Conn v. Whitmore has the case, it has both questions:
Does the court have jurisdiction under the state's own law? If it does,
then can this jurisdiction be validly exercised under the Federal Con-
stitution?
When the state court exercises jurisdiction by entering a judg-
ment it must necessarily have answered both questions in the affirma-
tive. When this judgment is challenged in another state, only the
second question-validity under the Federal Constitution-is open.
The first question-validity under the state's own law-has been an-
swered by the only judicial body with authority to do so, subject
to correction, of course, by a higher judicial body in the same state.
The Supreme Court of Utah is in good company in failing to
distinguish between the two issues. The United States Supreme Court
has itself, without any real discussion of the matter, apparently
sanctioned the practice. In Adam v. Saenger 3 the Court did not dis-
approve of a Texas court's substituting its judgment for that of a
California court on the question of whether the California court had
jurisdiction under California law, but instead the U. S. Supreme Court
found that the Texas court had erroneously interpreted California
law. The most extreme example of this practice is to be found in
Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co.,14 wherein the Idaho courts sub-
stituted their judgment for that of the Washington courts on a ques-
tion of jurisdiction under Washington law after the Supreme Court
of Washington had decided the issue in a prohibition proceeding.
If, as is argued here, this practice is wrong, the question may be
u95 U.S. 714 (1878).
2355 U.S. 220 (1957).
3303 U.S. 59 (1938).
u3o8 U.S. 66 (1939).
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asked as to why courts are misled into the error. There are two rea-
sons, it is believed, both in the nature of tacit assumptions, upon
which the courts are acting without being conscious of -them.
Appellate courts have become so accustomed to affirming and re-
versing trial courts and "making" law that it is assumed that they-
the appellate courts-are the only courts that do declare the law. In
this, they overlook the fact that nearly all law is judicially determined
in the first instance by trial courts, and that appellate courts only can
consider such initial determinations of law as are brought to them for
review.
The other reason, somewhat related to the first one, is that courts,
and the legal profession generally, have come to assume that only
opinion-writing courts make law. The opinion rather than the judg-
ment is viewed as the declaration of law. Therefore, the judicial
action of the Illinois trial court in entering a judgment was ignored
by the Utah courts as not being a "law declaring" action. If the Illi-
nois trial court had written an opinion flatly stating that under the
Illinois decision of Nelson v. Miller the court did have jurisdiction,
very probably the Utah courts would have seen that this was not a
matter of their concern, so that they would only have undertaken to
examine Illinois jurisdiction under the Federal Constitution. Absent
the written opinion, however, the Utah courts ignored the Illinois
judgment as being in and of itself a declaration of Illinois law on the
jurisdictional point.
The concept of due process in this area of jurisdiction under the
Federal Constitution is a peculiar one. Suppose Whitmore had special-
ly appeared in the Illinois proceeding and, having lost in the Illinois
courts, appealed to the U. S. Supreme Court. What result? In applying
International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington the U. S. Supreme Court
might very well find that Whitmore was subject to the jurisdiction of
the Illinois courts and so the Illinois judgment would be valid and
consistent with the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Alternatively, suppose that in Conn v. Whitmore itself, Conn had ob-
tained review by the U. S. Supreme Court. What result? In applying
International Shoe and related decisions the Court could find evi-
dence to support the Utah determination that Whitmore was not
transacting business in Illinois, so that the Utah action declaring the
Illinois judgment invalid under the fourteenth amendment would be
affirmed. Thus, the validity of the Illinois judgment, that is, due
process of law, depends on which judgment is reviewed. The Illinois
judgment reviewed directly, by appeal from the Illinois courts, is
valid, because it is consistent with due process of law. The Illinois judg-
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ment reviewed indirectly, by review of the Utah action declaring it
invalid, is void because inconsistent with due process of law.15
One final comment. The Utah court in Conn. v. Whitmore never
reached the merits of the controversy between the parties, nor are the
merits clear. The gestation period in mares varies from 304 to 419
days, with the average about eleven months.16 Therefore, it is en-
tirely possible that in February '955 the seller in referring to a 1955
foal did not intend to offer for sale a mare in foal while the buyer
could reasonably have thought that he was being offered a mare in
foal. Wherever justice lies in this particular case, the poor state of the
administration of justice is clear. After a judicial proceeding in Illi-
nois, another in Utah, including an appeal to the highest court of
Utah, more than three years of time gone by, the merits of a con-
troversy over the $750 purchase price of a mare have not yet been
reached. Presumably only the U. S. Supreme 'Court can finally lay
down the conditions under which the merits of the controversy can
be litigated, and that Court's determination will depend, not on the
merits, but on which judgment it is reviewing. In this way justice is
enmeshed and smothered in sterile legalisms.
" 5This point is developed more fully, as it relates to conflicting determinations of
domicile, in Ritz, Migratory Alimony: A Constitutional Dilemma in the Exercise of
in Personam Jurisdiction, 29 Fordham L. Rev. 83 (t96o).
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